

## FROM THE ARCHIVES

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# The Logbook of Editing Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Bemerkungen*: Rush Rhees' Letters to Georg Henrik von Wright 1962-64

### **Abstract**

Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright were Wittgenstein's literary heirs and edited many posthumous volumes from Wittgenstein's writings. Their archived correspondence provides unique insights into this editorial work. The selection of letters written by Rhees which is presented here stems from an early phase of his editorial endeavour to shed light on Wittgenstein's philosophical development between the *TLP* and the *PI*. The letters were written between 1962 and 1964, in connection with the volume that appeared as *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (PB 1964), and show how Rhees' understanding of Wittgenstein's texts developed during editing. They contain some of the central considerations that governed Rhees' work as Wittgenstein's literary executor.<sup>1</sup>

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## **Introduction**

Anyone who has ever read a letter by Rush Rhees will immediately recognize a certain tone: crisp, bold, and yet careful and thoughtful, sometimes hesitant, but always reflecting a man on a quest for an authentic expression of what he felt right. This gives Rhees' letters a freshness and liveliness that make them far more than a mere transmission of information. Both his letters on philosophical issues, and on his work with Wittgenstein's manuscripts are full of serious concern and deep thought and sometimes expand into small treatises. At the same time, it is characteristic that even such elaborations always carry the atmosphere of spontaneous, direct communication that was the soil for Rhees' own thinking. Accordingly, Dewey Z. Phillips reports that after meetings of the Philosophical Society at the University of Swansea, "it was not at all unusual for the person giving the paper, or for someone who had made a particular contribution to the discussion, to receive long typed letters from Rhees which were philosophical papers in themselves" (Phillips 2006: 247). Something similar could be said of the here-presented letters written between 1962 and 1964: They are delicate and sensitive investigations into the development of Wittgenstein's thought, his ways of writing and composing, and into how all this manifests itself in the manuscripts he left behind.

In 1962, Rhees took up the work of editing the so-called Moore Volume (Ts 209, 1930, first edited in *PB* 1964). This collection of typescript cuttings contained Wittgenstein's work from the first year after his return to philosophical writing in 1929. The literary executors called it the Moore Volume because it had been in the possession of Georg Edward Moore who – in accordance with Wittgenstein's intention<sup>2</sup> – turned it over to Rhees in 1951. As it had been given to Bertrand Russell in connection with a report

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and the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki for granting access to their holdings and providing infrastructural and scientific support. For help in editing I am especially grateful to the NWR section editor Alois Pichler for corrections.

<sup>2</sup> Wittgenstein wrote to Moore in December 1948: "And at the same time I thought of something else you promised me then, i.e., putting it into your will that my type-scripts, now in your possession, should, after your death, go to my executors, or to me if I should then be alive". Letter from Wittgenstein to Moore, 16 December 1948, published in *WC* 2012, letter No. 394.

supporting a renewal of Wittgenstein's fellowship at Trinity College (Russell 1971: 196-200), the Moore Volume may be considered a presentation of Wittgenstein's philosophizing at a certain point of time. Hence, although it may not be regarded as a finished work, to Wittgenstein's literary executors the Moore Volume may have come across as almost ready for publication. Indeed, shortly after the *PI* were published in 1953, Anscombe's husband Peter Geach wanted Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright to publish the Moore Volume soon. Von Wright concurred in a letter to Anscombe on 4 April 1953:

In your last letter you mentioned that Peter was urging us to publish the "Moore-Volume" soon. This caused me to re-read the thing and to compare it with the mathematical part of the "Big Typescript" and with the fragments on mathematical topics from about the same period. I am very glad I did this.

I read the M-V for the first time in Autumn 1951. Then I took chief interest in comparing it with W's position in the *Untersuchungen*. I remember being struck by the fact that some of it appeared rather tentative and unfinished, and that much of it was definitely superceded by the later writings. My impression was certainly much affected by the fact that it was the first W-manuscript, other than the *Untersuchungen* (and the Blue Book), which I had ever read. (I read it, moreover, under very unfavourable personal circumstances.)<sup>3</sup>

This time the M-V made a much stronger impression on me. There are passages in it which I like very much, and there are others – particularly some on mathematical logic – which I find rather dull. As far as the sections on logic and mathematics are concerned it is probably right to say that the M-V is, by and large, an improved version of the corresponding material in the "Big Typescript".<sup>4</sup> It would be important to compare the two manuscripts in their entirety.

The M-V in many ways represents a "middle case" between the W. of the *Tractatus* and the W. of the *Untersuchungen*. It is often interesting from the point of view of illuminating the earlier work and

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<sup>3</sup> These circumstances may refer to von Wright's resigning from his professorship at Cambridge and moving houses to Finland; cf. Erbacher and Krebs 2015: 206-213.

<sup>4</sup> In fact, the Big Typescript (Ts 213, 1933, edited first in *PG* 1969) was composed three years later than the Moore Volume (Ts 209, 1930, edited first in *PB* 1964). Finding the correct chronological order of the items in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* was part of the literary executors' achievement during decades of curatorship. The following letters show a part of this work.

sometimes also as an anticipation of the later thoughts from the Blue Book onwards. It gets additional interest from the fact that it deals fairly extensively with certain topics on which, for all I know, W. has written hardly anything anywhere else. (Visual space geometry, recursive proof, probability (on which, however, he also wrote in the *Tractatus*.) Much in the M-V is certainly considerably weaker than anything in the *Tractatus* or the *Untersuchungen*.

I think there are a multitude of reasons for publishing the M-V next. At least, I feel definitely more inclined to publish it now than to publish either all or part of the stuff on mathematics which we read last Summer. But there are later writings after the *Untersuchungen* and probably also some earlier writings which I have not yet seen; and reading them may, of course, influence my opinion about what ought to be our “next move”. (Letter from von Wright to Anscombe, 4 April 1953, NLF, Coll.714.11-12)

Contrary to von Wright’s proposal, Rhees argued against publishing the Moore Volume next, as can be seen from his letter to von Wright from about a fortnight later:

One obvious reason in favour of publishing it next is that it is in a more finished condition than anything else (except the *Investigations*).

But I am doubtful, all the same. About making it the next thing, I mean. I agree with you that “Much in the M-V is certainly considerably weaker than anything in the *Tractatus* or the *Untersuchungen*”. It often expresses views which will seem to foster current misunderstandings of Wittgenstein, and will hinder an understanding of his later doctrines. Hinder, because there are many, I think, who will lap up these statements more readily than the later ones; and such readers will – or may – not recognize the gap there is between this and his later position, but will think of his later statements in the light of these. (Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 22 April 1953, NLF Coll.714.200-201)

Von Wright regarded this objection as well-founded and, eventually, followed Rhees’ preference instead “to carve something” from Wittgenstein’s later work on the foundations of mathematics (cf. Erbacher 2015: 173-174). This editorial work resulted in the edition *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* that appeared in 1956 (*RFM* 1956, edited by von Wright, Anscombe and Rhees). *RFM* was followed by the editions *Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations. Generally Known as The Blue and Brown*

*Books* (BBB 1958, edited by Rhees) and *Notebooks 1914-1916* (NB 1961, edited by Anscombe and von Wright). It was only after these volumes had been printed that Rhees returned to editing the Moore Volume. In contrast to what he had written to von Wright in 1953, it was now Rhees who regarded publication of the Moore Volume as a matter of urgency, namely in order to foster an understanding of Wittgenstein's later writings.

Rhees was disappointed with the reception of the *Philosophical Investigations* and the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* at that time. Studying Wittgenstein's manuscripts and typescripts from the first years after resuming philosophical writing in 1929, Rhees came to believe that they could "show what the *Untersuchungen* really are" (letter 25 September 1962, cf. the second part of this paper). He himself was intrigued by seeing, for example, that the discussions of family resemblances or the use of language games were rooted in insights that dated back to 1929/1930. These insights, in turn, sprang from Wittgenstein's work with revising viewpoints in the *TLP*. Hence, Rhees stated that "the later Wittgenstein' is a continuation of the same discussions which we have in the *Tractatus*" (letter 10 February 1963). Rhees hoped that if he would be able to make these connections available for the readers to see through his editions, they would more readily understand Wittgenstein's later writings and appreciate their depth. This idea motivated Rhees' subsequent editing, which may thus be called "genetic", in the sense that it aimed at facilitating understanding of Wittgenstein's thoughts through volumes that would show their history.

The historical timing for editing the Moore Volume was favorable, as Brian F. McGuinness was just about to edit some of the papers of the late Friedrich Waismann in Oxford. In 1951, the literary executors' enquiries concerning relevant material in Waismann's possession had been futile (Letter from von Wright to Anscombe, 12 Nov 1952, NLF, Coll.714.11-12), but now McGuinness found notes from the discussions between Wittgenstein, Waismann, and Moritz Schlick that took place in 1929 and 1930 (edited in *WWK* 1967). Thus, the notes from these discussions stemmed from the same period as Wittgenstein's

remarks in the Moore Volume. Rhees and McGuinness subsequently exchanged information concerning the materials they worked on. The two editorial projects illuminated each other, and the mutual influence of Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Circle became more tangible. Eventually, Rhees included a selection of Waismann's notes into his edition of the Moore Volume, published as *Philosophische Bemerkungen* in 1964 (*PB* 1964). To mark the collaboration with McGuinness during the editorial work on *PB*, the selection of letters published here concludes with a note that Rhees sent to McGuinness upon the appearance of the book. This letter also shows Rhees' disappointment in connection with the first printing of *PB*, when the printing started before he had the chance to include an index. The one who had urged publication was taken by surprise.

Although the venture into editing the writings of what von Wright had called "a middle case" between *TLP* and *PI* starts with a shock – when Rhees loses the Moore Volume in a telephone booth (see first letter below) – the letters testify to Rhees' uncompromising loyalty to Wittgenstein and to his felt duty as Wittgenstein's literary executor. These letters let us witness how Rhees' understanding of the development of Wittgenstein's thought grew while he edited his writings. Furthermore, they make clear that editing the Moore Volume was not an isolated event, but rather part of a plan to edit also the so-called Big Typescript (T's 213, 1933, first edited in *PG* 1969): Rhees became aware that even though a great number of remarks occurred in both documents, the same remarks may play different roles in different contexts, or as he noted: "Certain philosophical differences can be brought out best by treating the same material in different ways – as in these two books" (letter from 14 January 1964). Adhering to his exegetical discoveries, *PB* was meant to give all interested readers a first stepping-stone in a path that followed Wittgenstein's thought from the *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations*; the second stepping-stone would be provided by Rhees' edition of the Big Typescript (*PG* 1969). Equipped with this editorial compass, Rhees entered into the "jungle" (Venturinha 2010: 1) of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*

and the letters presented here document one of the first attempts to chart this new land.

### ***Editorial Note***

In the following transcription of letters, corrections, deletions and spelling mistakes by the author of the letter were preserved only if they added to an understanding of the letters; few obvious orthographic mistakes were corrected. The letters were written with a typewriter; typewritten additions are placed in single slashes /, handwritten additions placed in slashes and set in *italics*. Line breaks have been preserved; page breaks are indicated by page number in square brackets, e.g. [page 2], paragraph breaks are preserved (although typographic variations in marking paragraph breaks have been omitted). Occasional comments in von Wright's hand have been omitted. The editor's comments to the letters appear in footnotes and square brackets. In cases where Rhees' German references to Wittgenstein's writings could be identified in Wittgenstein's Nachlass (*BEE* 2000 and other resources provided by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen), translations are based on *PB* 1975/*PB* 1998, *BT* 2005 and Intellex Past Masters *The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein*.

64a, Eaton Crescent,  
Swansea, Glamorgan.  
July 26th, 1962.

Dear Elizabeth, Dear von Wright,

I have lost the Moore Volume.<sup>5</sup> I went to London last weekend, and I took the volume with me in a brief case (in which there were some other books and papers). When I reached Paddington Station I wanted to make a telephone call. I have had another brief case with me as well as that one, and also a Makintosh; and I put them down inside the telephone booth. When I got down to the Underground platform, I realized that I had only one case with me, and I ran back up to the telephone booth. But the case was

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<sup>5</sup> Ts 209, 1930, first edited in *PB* 1964. The typescript is still missing.

gone. I notified the lost property office, and I also notified the railway police. The police told me that there were regular luggage thieves who hung about the station; that it would have been only too easy for one of them to take my case; and that it was unlikely that I would ever get it back. Since there was nothing in the case of any value to a thief, I hung about the station for an hour, and looked in all the places where I thought it might have been dumped. I also put an advertisement in the Evening Standard and in the Evening News, offering £100 reward for its return. And there it ends.

I wondered whether I was a fool to take the volume with me. But I should have had a little time to work in London; and I told myself that I would certainly never let it out of my sight.

I had let you down already, by taking so long over the job. It only needed this to put it in capital letters. (Or rather I cannot see that it needed this at all. It was plain enough.) I had begun typing it out again, using double spacing, and also introducing numbers dividing it into 'paragraphs'. My idea was that when I had written out the Inhaltsangabe,<sup>6</sup> the thing would then be druckfertig.<sup>7</sup> I was making two carbons of the new typescript which I was going to send to each of you.

I shall go on with this typing, anyway. I have the microfilm copy.<sup>8</sup> And I have about two thirds of the earlier typescript which was done by the Oxford typist. The first part of this was in

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in the case which I lost. In this I had given the pages of the manuscript books in which the manuscript text of the typescript passages was to be found; and I had begun to give the pages of the Big Manuscript<sup>9</sup> in which the pages of this typescript were repeated. I can do this over again (I have done some of it), and it is no serious loss. (Page 44 is missing from my copy of the microfilm.<sup>10</sup> But I think this page was identical with the one of the pages of the other typescript. If so, I am lucky. I am enclosing a copy of that typescript page. If you should have a chance to compare it with page 44 in your microfilm copy, and let me know

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<sup>6</sup> table of contents

<sup>7</sup> ready to print

<sup>8</sup> The literary executors had microfilmed many materials with support of the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950s. This is not the so-called Cornell microfilm that was produced in 1967.

<sup>9</sup> Ts 213, 1933, first edited in *PG* 1969.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Wittgenstein Source <[http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-209,44\\_f](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-209,44_f)>, Ts 209, 44 looks as if it is taken from a source different from the rest.

if it is not the same, I should be grateful. Otherwise I shall go ahead on the assumption that it is.)

As I say, I shall go on with the typing. I have proved that I am incompetent and irresponsible. I cannot ask to be allowed to do anything, or assume responsibility for anything. I only wish I were able to hand over the Moore Volume. If I can, I will write out some of the conclusions which I had come to about it – the relation it has (or the relation which the different stages in it have) to the *Tractatus* and also to the developments coming immediately afterwards, but prior to the Blue Book.<sup>11</sup> I have found all this extremely interesting. And I doubt if Wittgenstein's relation to 'logical positivism' will be clear until it has been sorted out. But I cannot claim any rights here. If I can write anything, I will place it at the disposal of someone of you.

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I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have had from Suhrkamp Verlag.<sup>12</sup> I know some of the things which should be said, in reference to the other volume they published. I do not see so much point in their publishing the English Blue and Brown Books.<sup>13</sup> And they should be told that it would not be 'complete' then anyway. But I should be grateful for suggestions for a reply.

Yours sincerely,  
*Rush Rhees*

64a, Eaton Crescent,  
Swansea, Glamorgan.  
August 12th, 1962.

Dear von Wright,

You are extremely generous.<sup>14</sup> I still believe that I

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<sup>11</sup> Ts 309, 1933/1934, first edited in *BBB* 1958.

<sup>12</sup> The publisher Suhrkamp published Wittgenstein's works in German. *PB* 1964 and *PG* 1969 were published first simultaneously by Suhrkamp and Blackwell without English translation.

<sup>13</sup> *BBB* 1958.

<sup>14</sup> Von Wright's response to Rhees' report of losing the Moore Volume is not preserved in NLF.

was incredibly stupid. And whereas I may have learned enough to avoid repeating just that mistake, God knows what else I may do. Certainly we are lucky in that we do have the photographs, and especially that we have the manuscript notebooks together with these. I should very much like to go on with work on these. I can only hope. If I were in your place, I doubt if I should have been as considerate as you are.

I am continuing with the typing. I am slow in this as in everything. I generally want to check the manuscript version – quite often this turns out to be important. And even when I can remember having read the passage in manuscript, I often have a long hunt trying to find it. (When I have found it, I write down the reference.) But I hope the job will be finished before too long.

There are minor matters which I should like to discuss with you and Elizabeth – concerning punctuation and the use of capitals to begin sentences in quotation, for instance. Wittgenstein is not consistent in this, and I often feel uncertain which trend to follow. But of course there are much more important questions too – questions for us to discuss, I mean – such as the relation of this to the Big Manuscript. On this latter point I may try to send you something when I can get it half way straight. The more I work on these writings, the more highly I think of them.

Thank you very much for checking the page I sent with the page 44 of the Moore Volume. Evidently I was lucky.

And thank you once again for your kindness.

*Rush Rhees*

64a, Eaton Crescent,  
Swansea, Glamorgan.  
September 4th<sup>15</sup> 1962.

Dear von Wright,

Thank you very much for your letter. I knew that Wittgenstein used to dictate to Schlick and Waismann<sup>16</sup> (in the early 30s,

<sup>15</sup> Indecipherable whether 4th or 5th September.

<sup>16</sup> The notes from the discussions between Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and Friedrich Waismann (1896-1959) have been edited by B.F. McGuinness in *WWK* 1967.

I thought; but I am not sure whether Wittgenstein told me the dates). But I had never thought of trying to learn whether any of this material was among Waismann's papers. I am very glad you thought of asking Hampshire. And I am glad Hampshire is one of the executors.<sup>17</sup>

We have not the manuscript version of the *Grundlagen der Mathematik* in the 'Big Manuscript'. Most of the rest of the BM is in the manuscript books IV, V and VI /and in earlier books/.<sup>18</sup> But we are without the MS books VII, VIII and IX.<sup>19</sup> And I expect the manuscript versions of the sections on mathematics in the BM were in them. One reason why I think this is that Band X<sup>20</sup> begins with what seems to be a continuation of the discussion in the previous volume. And this beginning is the passage on Skolem's proof which is given on pages 692 to 695 of Band the BM. (The BM typescript contains some minor pencilled correction to the manuscript statement.) There is one other passage in this same manuscript, namely that which begins on the last line of p. 671 of the BM and continues for the whole of 672. The rest is Umarbeitungen<sup>21</sup> of material in the MM<sup>22</sup> – Umarbeitungen which often appear in the BM. And then he seems to have gone over to Umarbeitungen of the BM itself – with special attention to the first chapter and what is said about 'Verstehen'<sup>23</sup> there. These Umarbeitungen are leading in the direction of the Brown Book.<sup>24</sup> And most of Band XI<sup>25</sup> is the Brown Book (but without the last passages in it), together with material which went into the Untersuchungen.

I do not think any of the 'Moore Manuscript' was written

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<sup>17</sup> Stuart Hampshire (1914-2001), Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) and Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) were appointed as literary executors in Waismann's will; cf. Schulte 1976.

<sup>18</sup> Band IV = Ms 108, 1930; Band V = Ms 109, 1930; Band VI = Ms 110, 1930-1931.

<sup>19</sup> Band VII = Ms 111, 1931; Band VIII = Ms 112, 1931; Band IX = Ms 113, 1931-1932; many, though not all, remarks on the foundations of mathematics in the Big Typescript (Ts 213, 529-768) are taken from Band VII-X; cf. *Wi* 2-5, 11. Band I-VII were found in Austria in 1952, Band VIII and IX were found in Austria 1965. As Rhees noticed when preparing the Big Typescript for publication, Band X and Band XI contained revisions of the Big Typescript (Mss 114ii, 115i; for this notation see Pichler 1994).

<sup>20</sup> Band X = Ms 114, 1932-1933; cf. Archival (by J. Smith) and Text genetic-philosophical notes (by J. Schulte) <[wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-114\\_m](http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-114_m)> (accessed 14 June 2017).

<sup>21</sup> revisions

<sup>22</sup> "Moore Manuscript" = Ts 209.

<sup>23</sup> understanding

<sup>24</sup> Ts 310, first edited in *BBB* 1958.

<sup>25</sup> Band XI = Ms 115, 1933-1936; cf. Archival (by J. Smith) and Text genetic-philosophical notes (by J. Schulte) <[wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115\\_m](http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115_m)> (accessed 14 June 2017).

later than the first half of Band IV – i.e. the middle of 1930. I have no way of guessing when it was that he cut up the first typescript and rearranged it in the form of the Moore Volume. I guess that the manuscript in this rearranged form was his Fellowship Dissertation, on which you read Russell's<sup>26</sup> comments in the Trinity College minutes (? If that is what the book was: I forget).

I have said that Bde V and VI contain material which went into the BM. VI ends in June or July 1931. X begins 27.5.32 –

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– so there is a gap of about a year. During this time I think he made at least one version of the typescript. You will remember that many of the pages of the typescript have two numberings. This is not so throughout, and I do not know the extent of the typed revision. Although, as I say, some of the passages in I<sup>27</sup> appear in the typescript which we have, there is also a reference to the typescript in this manuscript book; and I think it is clearly not to the Moore Volume Typescript. Also, many of the corrections which were begun on the existing typescript, were transferred to IX or to X; or so I guess: it is possible that the first writing is in the manuscript book, but from the appearance I would say this is certainly not always so.

So I suppose he had made and was correcting the typescript at the time at which he was dictating to Schlick and to Waismann.

#### September 25th.

This letter was interrupted. This is generally bad, with me. And then I made the mistake of thinking that I should like to write some things in this letter, which in fact I have not been able to get straight. I will just try to complete what I was saying the page and a half above, and then send the thing off, however formless it may be.

As I say, it is clear that he was revising the typescript which we call the 'Big Typescript'<sup>28</sup> – or rather, he was revising the first version of it – when he was writing notebooks X and XI. That is, he was revising the already existing typescript (which was not the 'Moore Manuscript') in May 1932. And his revisions of this typescript finally led to the Brown Book, which does not look like the offspring of it. The passages in the 'Big Typescript' on which Wittgenstein has written the greatest number of revisions, corrections

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Editor's note to *PB* 1964 and Russell 1971: 196-200.

<sup>27</sup> Band I = Ms 105, 1929.

<sup>28</sup> Ts 213, 1933, first edited in *PG* 1969.

and additions, are those passages where he is discussing the relation of */Sp/rach/e/* and *Wirklichkeit* and the relation of *Gedanke und Wirklichkeit*.<sup>29</sup> It would be interesting to try to show what was going on here – if only I could keep the account from being too complicated. Anyway, I am not going to try to do anything of the sort now. I might mention only for example that he was changing his view of *Satz* and of the relation of *Satz und /Sprache/*.<sup>30</sup> He had changes already in the Moore Manuscript (e.g., ‘Der Begriff des Elementarsatzes verliert nun überhaupt seine frühere Bedeutung’;<sup>31</sup> doubts whether it made any sense to talk of a general form of proposition; the conception of ‘Hypothesen’;<sup>32</sup> the different view of generality; the different view – or at any rate the deep questioning – of the

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of the relation of *Sätze und Gleichungen*;<sup>33</sup> the different view of generality in mathematics; und anderes mehr.<sup>34</sup>). These changes were connected with other discussions of logical doctrines, of course. But the change in the view of *Satz* in the Big Manuscript is much more radical. For one thing, it went together with the distinction between the meaning of a name and the bearer of a name. I say ‘went together with’ advisedly; for I am not prepared to say whether it was this different view of names that brought about the big changes in the view of *Satz*, or whether it was the other way about [sic]. At any rate, reflexions on ‘*/S/atZ*’ and on difficulties which he found in it, were leading him towards a change in the view of names. And I would say only that the two changes – the change in the conception of *Satz* and the change in the conception of names – were part of the same discussion.

*/(He was working towards this distinction already in 1929, in his criticism of Frege's idea of Begriff & Gegenstand.<sup>35</sup>)/*

I said that his changing view of *Satz* was connected with his questionings about the relation of *Sprache* and *Wirklichkeit*. And I will simply take a jump now, and say that this led him towards the emphasis on ‘*Sprachspiele*’<sup>36</sup> which we find in the Brown

<sup>29</sup> language and reality, thought and reality; cf. Ts 213, chapter 43.

<sup>30</sup> sentence and language; cf. Ts 213, chapter 15.

<sup>31</sup> The concept of an ‘elementary proposition’ now loses all of its earlier significance; *PB* 1975, 111; Ts 209, 35 Ms 108, 52.

<sup>32</sup> hypotheses

<sup>33</sup> sentences and equations

<sup>34</sup> and much more

<sup>35</sup> concept and object, *PB* 1975 119; Ts 209, 39; Ms 106, 111-112; Ms 107, 211-212.

<sup>36</sup> language games

Book. (He had been using the idea of Spiele<sup>37</sup> for some time before this. But he did not think, for some time, that they could replace an account of the relation of Sprache und Wirklichkeit.)

At the same time, in his ‘Umarbeitungen’ of the typescript, he was expanding his discussion of ‘Verstehen’, and of the relation between Verstehen and Lernen der Sprache.<sup>38</sup> This is also done in revision of the Big Typescript. And it may help to show how that revision resulted in something so different as the Brown Book seems – at first sight – to be.

The Brown Book never gets as far as a detailed discussion of mathematics. It says things – e.g. about generality, about the relation of formal and informal language, about (Nota Bene) the conception of going on in the same way, about ‘what can be said’ and much more – which have a bearing on the discussion of mathematics. It seems as though Russell and some others have never recognized this. And I think that the publication of these two typescripts would help to open people’s eyes.

I hope that Waismann’s notes from Wittgenstein’s dictations may have some of the material on mathematics which was in the manuscript books we lack (I think Wittgenstein destroyed them). For one thing the typescript often calls for figures which are not there. (I have found a number of the figures which belong in the Moore Manuscript, and I have no doubt the manuscript books had these others.) It is just possible that Wittgenstein drew these when he was dictating.

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dictating.

The Moore Manuscript is the more condensed, the more difficult and in some ways the better book. But I am certain it would be a very great mistake if we were not to publish the Big Manuscript as well. There is a great deal in it which is not in the Moore Manuscript at all – in any form. And if we publish the two together, it should help to show how Wittgenstein’s views were developing: and, if I may put it so, to show what the Untersuchungen<sup>39</sup> really are; and similarly for the Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> games

<sup>38</sup> understanding and learning of language

<sup>39</sup> *PI* 1953.

<sup>40</sup> *RFM* 1956.

An example in reference to the discussions of mathematics. Maybe it is not a very good one. The section on mathematics does not occupy as large a part of the Big Manuscript as the discussions of mathematics in the Moore Manuscript do in that. But when you do read the section on mathematics in the Big Manuscript you see how much of the earlier discussions on logic and language is involved and applied in this account of mathematics. And you can see why certain of his views on mathematics were changing, even since the Moore Manuscript.

The discussion of Skolem's proof is very much fuller in the Big Manuscript than in the Moore Manuscript (although it is surprising how much of it there is there).<sup>41</sup> I do not say that Wittgenstein's discussion of this is good in every way. I know Kreisel<sup>42</sup> would object to it; and it may probably contain some down-right mistakes in the interpretation of recursive proofs, or what these proofs are supposed to be – or it may not, I do not know. I would favour publishing it all the same, because it does show how certain parts of Wittgenstein's discussion of the relation of mathematics and logic were going. It illuminates certain of his ideas and certain of his difficulties about the conception of generality in mathematics; of the relation between mathematical expressions (equations, especially) and Sätze; of the relation between mathematical proof and logical proof – and others. I do not think Kreisel was interested in these points. And this is why I want to publish it in spite of his disparaging remarks.

The reception of the Untersuchungen<sup>43</sup> has been disappointing. And the Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik<sup>44</sup> have been largely neglected.

I do not think people will begin to appreciate the Untersuchungen until they see the discussion from which it has come. It would not be enough, just to print it together with the Tractatus. This would suggest that the relation between them is

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is much simpler than in fact it is. People would still not guess the magnitude of the development which there has been. They would not see – as they do not see – what has happened: they would not see what the Untersuchungen are saying.

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<sup>41</sup> Cf. *PB* 1975, 194-195; *Ts* 213, chapters 127, 130.

<sup>42</sup> Georg Kreisel (1923-2015), cf. Kreisel 1958.

<sup>43</sup> *Philosophical Investigations*, *PI* 1953.

<sup>44</sup> *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, *RFM* 1956.

People generally do not see, apparently, how closely the *Untersuchungen* and the *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen* are connected with one another.

For instance, the ideas of generality which the *Untersuchungen* offers in the remarks about ‘family resemblances’ (vide Bambrough)<sup>45</sup> are a continuation of the discussion begun in 1929: the distinction between generality in mathematics, on the one hand, and ‘der gewöhnlichen Allgemeinheit’<sup>46</sup> on the other; the insistence that the ‘constants of generality’ in Russell’s logic are ambiguous; the rejection of the ‘extensive Auffassung’<sup>47</sup> (and so of Wittgenstein’s own earlier view of generality); the view that the certainty of mathematics does not depend on logic nor on tautologies – all this is in the Moore Manuscript (and is before the end of 1930). Here the bearing of the discussion on the views of the *Tractatus*/is fairly plain/. Whereas if you read the *Untersuchungen* on ‘family resemblances’ – then, unless you read it very carefully, it may seem as though Wittgenstein were disregarding (or were not interested in) the problems of generality in logic and in mathematics which he had discussed in the *Tractatus*. At any rate you get little idea of the long and granite-hard discussions through which Wittgenstein worked to this position. So that in one sense you do not see the point that he is making. (Almost: you do not see what he is replying to.)

With regard to the genesis of the Brown Book and of the *Untersuchungen*:

I am enclosing a copy I have typed (badly) of some remarks Wittgenstein makes in the course of the last 123 /p/ages of Manuscript Volume VI, during June and July 1931. If we are looking for the origin of the use of ‘language games’ as a philosophical method, then I think that one source or one influence was this reflexion on the analogy of metaphysics and magic, and on Frazer’s misunderstanding of the magic about which he was writing.<sup>48</sup> (A great deal of Band VI is included in the Big Typescript. But none of these remarks is.)

I think this discussion of magic shows something very

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<sup>45</sup> Renford Bambrough (1926-1999), cf. Bambrough 1960-1961.

<sup>46</sup> usual generality; Ms 106, 88-89.

<sup>47</sup> extensional viewpoint; Ms 106, 35.

<sup>48</sup> Band VI=Ms 110; Rhees edited Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer in *GB* 1967 (English translation *GB* 1971, *GB* 1989); cf. *GB* 1993.

important about the use of language games. It shows an importance which they have, which would not easily be recognized otherwise

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otherwise. It helps to show why he thought that they were the right method of bringing out what metaphysics is, and of bringing out the relation between metaphysics and the sensible use of language.

But it shows also how natural metaphysics is – how deep it is rooted in human life; and how stupid it is to speak as though metaphysics were just silly. Wittgenstein’s discussion here helps to show the kinship between our own thinking and metaphysics. And what I am suggesting is that the use of language games does the same; and that this is one of the reasons why it is important as a method of philosophy.

He is moving in the direction of the use of language games when he says, on page 199 of the Manuscript Volume VI: ‘Was tut der, der eine neue Sprache erfindet? Nach welchem Prinzip geht er vor? Denn dieses Prinzip ist der Begriff der Sprache.’ And on the next page: ‘Erweitert jede erfundene Sprache den Begriff der Sprache?’<sup>49</sup> And there are others. Both these remarks occur in the Big Typescript. But notice that Wittgenstein first makes them directly in connexion with what he has been writing about Frazer.

Once again, I would emphasize that people have not appreciated the depth of what is being done in the Investigations. (I do not suggest, of course, that these remarks about Frazer are as important as the logical discussions.)

I am told that Ayer<sup>50</sup> has grown so hostile to Wittgenstein that he will not allow any of his pupils to mention him in their essays.

Yours sincerely,  
*Rush Rhees*

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<sup>49</sup> What does a person do who constructs (invents) a new language? According to what principle does he proceed? For this principle is the concept “language”. [...] Does every invented language expand the concept of language?; Ms 110, 199-200; cf. Ts 213, 65; *PB* 1975, 115.

<sup>50</sup> Alfred Ayer (1910-1989).

64a Eaton Crescent,  
Swansea, Glamorgan.  
February 10th, 1963.

Dear von Wright,

I was extremely grateful for your letter of January 31st. There are a great many things I should like to write in connexion with it. But if I try to say all I should like to, I shall delay and delay. So I will be short – as short as I can – and try to write further later on.

I am applying for ‘leave of absence’ next year, in order that I may get ahead with the Wittgenstein material, and I think I shall probably be allowed it. (I shall not be ‘absent’, for I shall stay here where my material is; but I shall not be teaching.)

I am very glad that you agree that we should publish the BM. There are only two of your suggestions about which I am doubtful: 1) Whether we should delay publishing the MM until after the BM; and 2) whether we should delay publishing the BM until we have a translation which we can publish at the same time.

Let me remark first that I have not abandoned making a new typescript of the MM. But I have done hardly anything on it since the end of September, when our session started. I have completed about three quarters of it. But I have still to read through the three quarters which I have typed, in order to correct typing errors (which are scandalously many) and introduce ‘ß’ in place of ‘ss’ where this is needed. (I have only just had an ‘ß’ put into this machine.) I had hoped to find some German students in the University here who would be willing to earn a little money by doing this checking for me, but I have had no luck so far. I should like to send you what I have done, at least. For although I constantly make typing errors, it does make a difference to have the text set out on a wider page and with wider spacings. It makes more difference than one would expect.

I have been more and more impressed by the MM as I have been typing it. I have sought out the manuscript passage for each paragraph in the typescript. This has been a help to my understanding, since the manuscript passages are not in the order of the

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the typescript. They are often a setting of other manuscript remarks which he did not type, and sometimes these are helpful. In a very few cases I have quoted something from these in footnotes to the typescript I am making. It has also been interesting to notice the different dates of the passages. The work is much more

coherent and systematic than I had realized from my earlier readings. I have hoped that I might do something to bring this out by preparing an Inhaltsangabe. But I have got only a very little way with this. It */the/* MM is coherent an */d/* systematic – but it is very condensed. This means that in some ways it is more difficult than the BM. But it also means that the MM produces a somewhat different effect (a very powerful effect, I think). And this is one reason – though an incidental one – for printing it. It is one of the features which makes it more plainly ein Weiterschreiten<sup>51</sup> from the Tractatus.

It is true that almost all of it appears in one place or another in the BM. (At the moment I am not sure that the BM has everything which is said in the MM about irrationale Zahlen;<sup>52</sup> but I can easily check this.) But as they are presented in the MM, they really give a different statement. They give a statement of the view which Wittgenstein was putting forward in 1929 and the first half of 1930. It was a view which was very influential at the time, although it was not understood. It influenced Schlick, and I think it influenced Carnap;<sup>53</sup> and perhaps some others. People are still unclear about the influence of Wittgenstein on the Wiener Kreis, and they try to ascribe this influence to the Tractatus. This generally leads them to read the Tractatus wrongly. I think the MM is interesting because it shows both the source of the impetus of much of the early work of the logical positivists, and also how hopeless it was to look for a clue to Wittgenstein's views in their misunderstandings of him. *(I will enclose a copy of the proof sheets of a discussion which will be printed in the Philosophical Review.<sup>54</sup> It may illustrate one or two points.)*

Quite often the passages from the MM appear in the BM in quotation marks, because Wittgenstein is treating them as material for discussion and not as a view which he is putting forward. But these are a minority; for the most part they do form

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form part of the BM text. But I repeat: they are not a statement of the same position. To me it is surprising how different the same remark can be when it is a part, so to speak, of a different construction. There are certain changes in the BM which are funda-

<sup>51</sup> a progression

<sup>52</sup> irrational numbers

<sup>53</sup> Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), cf. Iven 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Rhees 1963.

<sup>55</sup> There is a large cross pencilled across the entire page, uncertain in whose hand.

mental – such as the discussion of Verstehen with which it starts, for instance. This was connected with an increasing change in his ideas of Sinn and of Gedanke, and also of Tatsache.<sup>56</sup> So that in the BM he had already moved far from the notion of a parallel ‘hintereinander’<sup>57</sup> of structure of fact – structure of proposition – structure (articulation) of thought; even though he does still speak of the ‘prästabilierte Harmonie zwischen Gedanken und Wirklichkeit’.<sup>58</sup> I agree that the beginnings of this change are in the MM. But he had not seen how great a change it was going to be. And the MM is centred quite differently from the BM. For instance, he still thinks the idea of logical analysis is important, although he sees that it has got to be ‘turned through a slight angle’ from the way it was taken in the Tractatus. The very first remark in the MM is concerned with this. It is in many ways a radically different account of logical analysis from that in the Tractatus, because he does not speak in just the same way of ‘symbols’. (Conferre ‘die natur-notwendige [sic] Zeichen’ in the Tractatus.<sup>59</sup>) But he still wants to talk of selbstverständliche – well, not of selbstverständliche Zeichen, perhaps (although there is something of this), but of eine selbstverständliche Darstellung, als eine ideale Grenze aller logischen Analyse.<sup>60</sup> This is the point of speaking of the idea of ‘einer phänomenologischen Sprache’<sup>61</sup> in this connexion. (All of this interests me so much that I want to go on, but I must turn it off.)

When he mentions these matters in the BM, in the section on ‘Phänomenologie’,<sup>62</sup> for instance, they have not anything like the importance which they have in the MM. And one would never even guess; that they had been as important to him as they were in the MM; nor see why they should have been.

And in the BM the idea of logical analysis – or of its importance in what he now calls einer grammatischen Untersuchung<sup>63</sup> – has faded.

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If we published the BM without the MM, then people would still find the hiatus between ‘this Wittgenstein’ and ‘the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus’ a mystery. They will not be able

<sup>56</sup> sense, thought, fact

<sup>57</sup> one behind the other

<sup>58</sup> pre-established harmony between thoughts and reality; Ts 213, 189.

<sup>59</sup> naturally necessary signs; cf. *TLP* 6.124.

<sup>60</sup> not of natural signs [...] but of a natural representation as the limit of all logical analysis

<sup>61</sup> phenomenological language; *PB* 1975, I.

<sup>62</sup> phenomenology; Ts 213, 436-485.

<sup>63</sup> a grammatical investigation

to see how he got there. There is a gap even with the MM; but it is not nearly so great. It seems to me that it is important to show that ‘the later Wittgenstein’ is a continuation of the same discussions which we have in the Tractatus.

By the way, Wittgenstein told me that he was teaching school for 5 ½ years. I think he began in 1922, but I must look this up in the letters to Russell to make sure.<sup>64</sup> This would mean that he left off teaching possibly before the beginning of 1928. He began doing philosophy in Cambridge in January 1929. I know that he did various other things for a while – that he was gardener for a Kloster<sup>65</sup> for a few months. But I wonder also whether he was having philosophical discussions with anyone regularly. Schlick had been to see him while he was still teaching in Trattenbach; and Ramsey<sup>66</sup> too. But I have wondered whether he discussed and wrote on philosophy before he came to Cambridge. Some of his references to the view he once held about ‘primäre und sekundäre Sprachen’<sup>67</sup> suggest this. (This whole view, by the way, is extremely interesting because of the entirely different sort of view that Carnap put forward.) I do not think this question is so very important. But I wonder whether you have any information about it.

#### February 14th.

This was interrupted – something went wrong with my typewriter. An interruption is always bad, because then other things crowd in the way and I am late in taking it up again. I will try to reply to the other points in your letter as shortly as I can. (I have not said just what I want to say about publishing the MM, but we can take this up again later.)

As you say, it will need a lot of work to prepare the text of the BM. In some sections the revisions are much more frequent and much more extensive than in others. He kept revising the parts which have to do with the relation of language to reality, for in-

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instance. Some of these revisions are copied out (often in a further revised form) in the manuscript books X and XI. And some of them have been included in the Investigations. The number

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<sup>64</sup> Wittgenstein was teaching as elementary school teacher from autumn 1920 until spring 1926.

<sup>65</sup> monastery

<sup>66</sup> Frank Ramsey (1903-1930)

<sup>67</sup> primary and secondary languages

of passages which have a ‘Strich’<sup>68</sup> through them is greater than your copy shows. (I hope I shall manage to send you a better copy.) But where the line is a vertical one, for instance, I do not think it means that Wittgenstein is rejecting the passage.<sup>69</sup> It may mean that he has revised it, or it may mean that he has included it in some other manuscript. It would be best to compare manuscript versions where these are available. But I think perhaps this work will not be quite as overwhelming as it may seem at first glance.

Of course I should be extremely grateful if you were willing to join in the work with me to any extent. As I say, I have become very interested in it, and I should be sorry if I had to drop out altogether (although if a little more time shows that I am just incompetent, then I would do this). But I certainly have no wish for anything like ‘proprietary rights’ in the job - on the contrary. Even to know that you were studying the manuscript and that I might write to you with questions on particular points, would be a great help.

(There is one question which does bother me in connexion with the MM text, and this is punctuation. Wittgenstein leaves out commas where I had thought they belonged. At first I thought this was carelessness in the manuscript, and that he had made the first typescript from the manuscript without thinking. // He wrote ‘by ear’ more than ‘by eye’ anyway, I think – witness his spelling not only in English but in German. // But over and over again I find that where the sentence from the MM has been included in the BM, in which the typing is much more careful, the commas are still left out. And this suggests to me that it was deliberate – perhaps that he regarded this very sparing use of punctuation as more informal, and that he wanted it this way. In English this would make sense, but I am not sure whether it would in German. I wish I knew some Austrian of Wittgenstein’s generation whom I might ask. On the whole I am keeping to the sparse punctuation which he has in his

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his typescript. I wish I could be sure whether he would have printed it that way. The trouble is that in general he was not anything like as meticulous about the punctuation of what he wrote, as he was about the phrasing. Sometimes, yes; but not generally.

I have sometimes wondered whether rather queer sounding Fremd-wörter<sup>70</sup> may not be Anglicisms, and whether it would not be

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<sup>68</sup> line

<sup>69</sup> For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s section markings in the manuscripts and typescripts in connection with *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, see Pichler 1994, chapters 2.1 and 2.2.

better to substitute the German form. (“Annäherung” instead of “Approximation”, for instance.) But in his generation in Austria I think the foreign forms were much commoner than they are now; so probably they should be left, in most cases. Sometimes he uses the foreign form in one line, and the German in the next, and in such cases I suppose we might make it the German form throughout.)

About the translation. I am reluctant to postpone publishing the German text until an English translation is ready, because I think this might mean a pretty long delay. The translator could not even begin translating those portions in which the text has to be settled until this was done. You do not give your reasons for thinking it would not be good to have the German text appear first, and the English translation later, and it may be that there is some important consideration I have overlooked. I do not like translating: one trouble is that I am unconscionably slow, as I am about everything else. ‘On paper’ there would be this to be said for my trying to do it – that I shall be working on the text pretty constantly anyway, so that I ought to have a ‘head start’. But I would rather not commit myself just yet, if you will allow me this. If I could manage to get some sort of secretarial help next year, then it might be that I could manage it. But I would rather think it over a bit more. The question whether the German should not be published before the translation is ready, remains anyway, of course.

With regard to your special questions:

1) I have made a photocopy of the microfilm copy of page 38 of the MM, and I am enclosing it here. The microfilm copy is (mea culpa) all that I have, and it is not very clear. The copy

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copy which I have made of this, is even less clear. But I cannot do any better, with my present equipment. (I can make accurate copies of a printed page, but not of this microfilm print.) I hope it may be just legible. I assume that you have the typescript copy which the Oxford typist made. I will try to send you mine soon.

There is no page missing between 62 and 63. The reference to ‘der ersten Klammer’<sup>71</sup> at the top of 63, is to the expression (n):(E nx).Fx at the end of the third paragraph on page 62.

There is no page missing between pages 94 and 95. The

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<sup>70</sup> foreign words

<sup>71</sup> the first bracket; Ts 209, 63; PB 1975, 160.

fragment at the top of 95 belongs to a passage which I think Wittgenstein meant to include here. It /stands with the neighbouring/ passage in the manuscript book. And he did include it in the corresponding passage in the BM. It is given as the last paragraph of BM page 445.

2) I do not want the duplicate copies of pages in the copy of the BM which I sent you.

The pages 393-398 had been taken out of the BM and pasted into the manuscript Band XI. They form part of a revised version of topics including some of those immediately preceding and immediately following. I will send you a typed copy which I have made. (I have made two carbons).

3) I have the photo-copies of the five fragments you mention. But I am glad you did mention them, because I had stupidly not put them together with the other material with which they belong and I have not studied them. As I look through them quickly now, they seem to be mainly material which is in the other manuscripts. The same pages – 4 and 5 – are missing from my copy as from yours. It may be that Wittgenstein has included them somewhere else. I will try to find out.

4) I am uncertain what should be done with the remarks about magic and Frazer.<sup>72</sup> I think they ought to be published, and I do not think they should be published by themselves – since this would give rise to queer sorts of misunderstandings. Perhaps they could be brought into a preface. On the other hand, there is a

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draft of a preface which Wittgenstein did write at this time – or rather there are several drafts of part of it – which I have been meaning to copy out and send you.<sup>73</sup> I hope I shall do this very soon. This preface is extremely interesting, and I think it is important. Of course, there is no reason why the remarks about magic should not be included as well – except that this is going to make the preface pretty long.

I have said already that I think there will have to be be either a long preface or else a separate article (which would have to be just as long). In many ways it would be better if it could go as a preface, since the point is to help towards an understanding, and to guard against misunderstandings as far as may be.

5) I have been in correspondence with McGuinness about the Waismann material. I have been meaning to write to Stoothof<sup>74</sup> (who

<sup>72</sup> See footnote 45.

<sup>73</sup> Ms 109 (= Band V), 1930, 204-208.

is in Edinburgh) but I have not done so. From what McGuinness told me I suspect that the material which /Stoothof/ has will not have much that is relevant to Wittgenstein; but I cannot be sure until I do write him. McGuinness sent me two fairly longish dictations.<sup>75</sup> They were interesting in certain ways (I have made copies of them, with his permission), but they did not add anything important to what is in Wittgenstein's own manuscript books. They were from the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930. And there are places where I think Waismann has not understood Wittgenstein. I was hoping that there might be some material from the period from October 1931 to May 1932 but there does not seem to be anything available as yet; and I am not too hopeful.

The first half of June is always a difficult time for me, because our examinations come just then, and I can hardly ever get away. If I am given leave of absence next year, then June 1964 should be all right. But I doubt if I could manage that time this year.

I had better try to get this ragged letter posted.

Yours sincerely,  
*Rush Rhees*

'Burrowdown',  
Southward Lane,  
Langland, Swansea.  
January 14th, 1964.

Dear Elizabeth and von Wright,

I am sending you the typescript now.<sup>76</sup> Certain things must still be done to it; but I think it is in a state now that makes it sensible to discuss it. There are some questions about details – such as punctuation – which can be discussed more easily in conversation when we meet perhaps; although I have no objection to correspondence about them if either of you should want to suggest or ask anything. Anyway, I do want to mention one or two such matters now.

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<sup>74</sup> Presumably Robert H. Stoothoff, a philosopher known for his translations of the writings of Descartes and Frege. It is unclear which materials Rhees is referring to in this passage.

<sup>75</sup> McGuinness sent a number of notes and typescripts to Rhees in 1963-1964. Just which ones are meant here is not certain.

<sup>76</sup> Rhees' transcription of the Moore Volume (T's 209).

At the time when I lost the original typescript I told you that I was */giving the manuscript/* reference */for/* every paragraph in the typed version. I have done this – or nearly – in the photographed copy that I have. I say ‘or nearly’, because there are perhaps a dozen paragraphs in all for which I have not yet traced the reference. (Those which I had entered in an earlier typed copy were in the case in which the original copy was when I lost it.) I had meant first to write these references in the copies which I am sending you. But I began doing so – about one third the way through – for about a page and it seemed to me that they ‘interrupted’ the page and made it less readable. Since this book of Wittgenstein’s is not too easy to read anyway, I thought it better to leave the pages as lucid as I could make them. I want to make copies of the microfilm copy in which I have entered the references, and send these to you. The equipment I have does not do this very well (it seems to feel that a copy of a copy is contrary to nature) and I want to see if I can find a better way. But I think it important that the manuscript references should be available, and I will make copies in some way.

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I have not altered the order of the remarks in the original copy, – except in the passage which begins on page 114<sup>77</sup> in that copy (the microfilm copy which you have). Here Wittgenstein had some sort of lapsus in his cutting and pasting. The passage of which there are the first two lines near the top of 114, is continued on page 116. If we disregard what is said in the passages, there is no way of knowing whether he meant the continuation, which is on 116, to come before the rest of what is on 114 – or whether this beginning on 114 ought to have been left to 116. (Perhaps there is another copy somewhere in which he has not made this mistake.) We have to be guided by what seems the most intelligible arrangement, I think. And once you recognize that the order of the material in these 2 or 3 pages is ‘out’ in some way, I think you will see that the question affects more than just the passage which has been split. Anyway, I have followed my nose as best I might. I did not find any other difficulty of this sort.

I have numbered ‘paragraphs’ in the text. Sometimes, the point of division seems fairly plain. In other places it may seem as though the division should have come with the passage preceding, or not until the next passage after, and my choice may seem arbitrary. I can only hope that the matter is not often one of great consequence. (I have followed this paragraphing on my table of contents, and I should groan within me if it had to be abandoned.) I may say also that I do not think

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<sup>77</sup> Ts 209, 114.

that/the book is/quite homogeneous in its grouping of material in connected sections.

The first dozen pages, for instance, are different from what you will find if you look, say, half way through or two thirds of the way through the book.

In the table of contents – where the arabic numerals always refer to the ‘paragraphs’ of the text, not to the pages – I have made a further division into large sections or chapters, to which I have

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given roman numerals. These divisions have seemed to me fairly obvious. And I think that someone reading the work for the first time may find it confusing if there is not some such division. For this reason I am inclined to introduce these divisions in the text as well. At present I have given them only in the table of contents.

In a printed version the table of contents would of course give the page on which each paragraph begins.

I am in favour of keeping Wittgenstein’s title, ‘Philosophische Bemerkungen’. (Just as I would keep the title ‘Philosophie’ for the ‘big typescript’.)

The table of contents is long. But it is not longer, in proportion to the text, than the Inhaltsangaben of some works at which I have looked recently. I think in particular of some of the works of Franz Brentano which have been edited posthumously, and which have been given an analytical table of contents.<sup>78</sup> And I am sure that I could point to other examples. I have wanted to give something like an übersichtliche Darstellung<sup>79</sup> of the course of the work. I have found this hard, and I have not succeeded very well. As far as possible I have tried to do it by selecting Wittgenstein's own sentences. In general the text is tightly packed, so that what he says can hardly be said more shortly. I could have made a shorter table of contents with bare headings. But this would not have helped anyone to get a more summary view of the course of the discussion.

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About a year ago I wrote to von Wright that I thought both ‘the Moore volume’ (i.e. Philosophische Bemerkungen) and also ‘the

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<sup>78</sup> As a young researcher, Rhees assisted Alfred Kastil (1874-1950) who was literary executor of Franz Brentano’s writings. Between 1932 and 1933, Rhees made suggestions for Kastil’s edition *Kategorienlehre* (1934); cf. Erbacher & Schirmer 2017: 4-5. Von Wright had created another table of contents for the Moore Volume when reading it in the 1950s.

<sup>79</sup> perspicuous (Anscombe)/ surveyable (Hacker & Schulte) representation

Big Manuscript' (i.e. Philosophie) should be published, and I tried to mention one or two of my reasons for this. I meant to send a copy of my letter to Elizabeth, but I am not sure whether I did so or not. If I tried to say fully why I think we should publish both, I should be long winded; and I wish it were possible for us to talk about it. But I think the question whether we are to/publish both/, should be decided soon – before we meet in the summer. (I will try to say why in a minute)

I think von Wright feels strongly – and so do I – that Philosophie (the Big Manuscript) must be published. At one time we thought that if Philosophie were published, then it would be idle to publish the Philosophische Bemerkungen (the Moore volume), since the larger book seems to contain everything that there is in the Bemerkungen, in a better arrangement, together with important later developments. Now it does contain a great deal of the Bemerkungen, and it contains these passages verbatim. (Quite often they are in quotes in this manuscript, by the way.) But I do not think this is a reason against publishing both. It is also true that Philosophie has some things WHICH have been taken verbatim, or very nearly, into the Untersuchungen. This does not mean that Philosophie is just an earlier draft of the Untersuchungen; and I find nothing awkward in the repetition of the passages: I see them differently in the different contexts, and I think I understand them better. And I would say this with more emphasis of the passages from the Bemerkungen which are repeated in Philosophie. Except for very small clusters which are kept together as they were before, the passages have a quite different arrangement in the later typescript. This is partly a revision, I agree. On further reflexion

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reflexion Wittgenstein decided that they ought to go in that order. But much else had gone on in him as well. And his reasons for thinking that they ought to go in that order, often went with a different view of the question he was discussing in them. So that I think it is not generally a revised version of the same discussion, but a different discussion.

No doubt that is a matter of degree; and you can say that Philosophie is a revised version of the Bemerkungen – but then you will have to say the same of the Brown Book and of the Untersuchungen as well. In the manuscript volumes Wittgenstein spoke of all his Versuchen or Vorstudien of 'mein Buch' as Umarbeitungen<sup>80</sup> – and from July 1930 onwards they were Umarbeitungen of the Bemerkungen: until I suppose it had become plain that it was an Umarbeitung of an Umarbeitung. All the same, it is possible to distinguish what are

<sup>80</sup> of all his attempts or preliminary studies of 'my book' as revisions

earlier versions of, say, the first third of Philosophie (i.e., the chapters on Verstehen and Sinn des Satzes<sup>81</sup>), or earlier versions of the Brown Book. These have quite a different relation to one another than does, say, the Blue Book to the Brown Book (I would not call the Blue Book an earlier version of the Brown Book), or than does Philosophische Bemerkungen to Philosophie. These are different works, in spite of the fact that the later work has developed out of attempts to rewrite what was said in the earlier one.

But Philosophie does not contain the whole text of the Bemerkungen. And sometimes this goes with important differences in the two books. For example, the discussion of irrational numbers does not have the same importance in Philosophie as it has in the Bemerkungen. I am thinking of his discussion of such ‘Gebilden’ as ‘ $\sqrt{2}$  and  $\pi$ ’, for example. He does bring these into his discussion in Philosophie.

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Philosophie. But he does not dwell on them as long, and (or because) they have not the same point there. In the Bemerkungen one of his central discussions is of generality, and especially of the Extensionalaufassung der Begriffe und der allgemeinen Sätze.<sup>82</sup> (He was pre-occupied with this almost from the start of his writing after he came back to Cambridge in 1929.<sup>83</sup> I suppose it entered into his discussions with Ramsey too.<sup>84</sup> In Notebooks I and II he is distinguishing between the generality of ‘general propositions’ in Russell's sense, and the generality which we have in mathematics, such as the generality of a variable and the generality of a proof. He was sure that Russell was ignoring differences of form, and he objected to Russell's use of ‘alle’ as though it had the same function, although Wittgenstein thought it plain that its logical function was different. One consequence of this was that Wittgenstein came to see, already in 1929, that the idea of / *die allgemeine Satzform* / ‘der allgemeinen Satzform’ was empty and could not have the importance which he had given it in the Tractatus; and another consequence was that in this early period also he saw that the proofs or inferences/calculations/of mathematics have an independence which he had not recognized earlier, and that the role of the Wahrheitsfunktionen in der Mathematik<sup>85</sup> was difficult to see clearly.) His discussion of infinity is connected with this

<sup>81</sup> sense of a proposition; Ts 213, 59-141.

<sup>82</sup> extensional viewpoint of concepts and general propositions

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Ms 106.

<sup>84</sup> Frank Ramsey (1903-1930) visited Wittgenstein during his time as an elementary school teacher in lower Austria.

<sup>85</sup> truth functions in mathematics

question of the Extensionalauffassung, and so, of course, is his discussion of number: his insistence that we do not have a number unless we have a Gesetz, and that wir müssen das Gesetz in den Zahlen sehen können (Induktion, Allgemeinheit in der Mathematik usw, usw.<sup>86</sup>) The point about the freak irrationals which he invents – or one of the points – is that such a symbol does not stand for a number which has its Gesetz in sich. This, of course, is partly mit einem Hinweis auf Cantors Diagonalzahl<sup>87</sup> – which is no more a number than Wittgenstein's freak

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freak irrationals are. He is also able to illustrate by reference to these Gebilden<sup>88</sup> the kind of generality that there is in /mathematical/ induction.

It is the same discussion when he insists that it is idle to speak of a number which is given only by an external description: a number which we cannot reach by any calculation, or which we cannot construct. What is important for mathematical proof ist eine interne, nicht eine externe Allgemeinheit.<sup>89</sup>

And in this connexion he is already developing the distinction between 'counting within mathematics – counting the roots of an equation, or the points of intersection of a pentagram'– and 'counting outside mathematics: counting blood corpuscles or the inhabitants of a town[?]. To speak of the number of an aggregate, especially if this is something which has to be established by counting (rather than by calculation) is to speak of counting outside mathematics: and here there need be no generality at all – as when I tell you that I am holding three screws in my hand. Man hat sich den Weg zum Verständnis der Mathematik versperrt, wenn man von dieser Ecke aus die mathematische Allgemeinheit betrachten will.<sup>90</sup>

In interesting ways, which I must not try to develop here, the discussion of 'Phänomenologie' is connected with this.

My point is that he is really arguing to a different brief in the Bemerkungen, from that which he was putting forward in the Philosophie. And the fact that he gives the attention and emphasis to that discussion of irrationals is not something external. It goes with a central tendency of the book, which he was no longer developing in Philosophie.

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<sup>86</sup> law, and that we must be able to see the law in the numbers (induction, generality in mathematics asf.)

<sup>87</sup> partly, with a reference to Cantors diagonal number

<sup>88</sup> structures; cf. Ts 213, 759.

<sup>89</sup> it is an internal, not external generality; cf. Ms 106, 110.

<sup>90</sup> One has barred one's way to understanding mathematics, if one wants to look at mathematical generality from this angle.

This gets interrupted. And when I start again, I begin to think about the two books; und da bin ich sofort durch irgendwelche Grille gefangen, und schließlich alles abschneiden muß, um los zu kommen.<sup>91</sup>

In the Bemerkungen he speaks of writing low numbers in a Strich-notation<sup>92</sup> in which we can see die Strukturen der Zahlen<sup>93</sup> – as, for instance, we can see in a set of seven strokes that 7 is a prime number.

When he speaks of the genuinely arithmetical series, ‘wo ich ein Gesetz in den Zahlen sehe’<sup>94</sup> (p. 190 of typescript), this is probably connected with his remark that ‘der eigentliche mathematischer Satz ist der Beweis’.<sup>95</sup> But he has just said also, ‘Nur was ich sehe, ist ein Gesetz; nicht was ich beschreibe.’<sup>96</sup> And such remarks may sound like the view to which he later objected: the view that wenn wir etwas folgern, so muß es schon in dem enthalten sein, woraus es folgt<sup>97</sup> – the view that we draw the deduction from it somewhat as we draw a sting of pearls from a box. Or again, the view that the ‘structures’ of numbers are something on which we fashion the propositions of arithmetic. (Which might then appear as ‘eine Mineralogie der Zahlen’,<sup>98</sup> etc.)

I do not think Wittgenstein ever came near to holding such a view in the Bemerkungen. But he did say things which might be read in that way.

When he emphasizes ‘Strukturen’<sup>99</sup> here, it is partly in the attempt to avoid the Extensivauflassung.<sup>100</sup> So, when he says, ‘Eine reelle Zahl liefert Extensionen, sie ist keine Extension.’<sup>101</sup> And similarly, when mathematicians speak of ‘discovering’ on the ‘Zahlengerade’<sup>102</sup> further points – the irrationals – over and above the rational points, Wittgenstein says that ‘in Wahrheit konstruieren sie neue Punkte.’<sup>103</sup>: it has nothing to do with discovering the properties of an extension. So he

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<sup>91</sup> and there I am at once entangled in some idea and so have to cut everything to get disentangled

<sup>92</sup> stroke notation

<sup>93</sup> structures of numbers

<sup>94</sup> where I can see a law in the numbers; *PB* 1975, 235; *Ts* 209, 105.

<sup>95</sup> the real mathematical proposition is the proof; *Ms* 105, 59.

<sup>96</sup> Only what I see is a law; not what I describe; *PB* 1975, 234; *Ts* 213, 762; *Ts* 209, 105.

<sup>97</sup> if we infer something then it must be contained whence it follows

<sup>98</sup> mineralogy of numbers; cf. *Ms* 125, 16r.

<sup>99</sup> structures

<sup>100</sup> extensional viewpoint

<sup>101</sup> A real number yields extensions, it is not an extension; *PB* 1975, 228; *Ts* 209, 101.

<sup>102</sup> number line

<sup>103</sup> in fact they construct new points

often speaks of ‘constructing’ a number, and says it must be possible with regard to any number die Zahl zu konstruieren (oder: auszurechnen) – sie kann nicht bloß durch eine Beschreibung gegeben werden.<sup>104</sup> And a mathematical proof would be a Konstruktion.<sup>105</sup> This is what he later referred to as ‘die geometrische Auffassung des Beweises’.<sup>106</sup> But in the Bemerkungen it is related also to the connexion between Geometrie und Gesichtsraum.

He speaks of Arithmetik as eine allgemeinere Geometrie.<sup>107</sup> And he seemed to think that the primary data – or the primary standard of what is denkbar – lay in what was ‘possible’ and what was ‘impossible’ im Gesichtsraum.

In Philosophie<sup>108</sup> the discussion of Gesichtsraum<sup>109</sup> is different, even though it contains some of the remarks of the Bemerkungen. He now treats it as a confusion if one speaks of the Gesichtsraum as though this were itself a sort of Vorstellung<sup>110</sup> or Datum. The term ‘Gesichtsraum’ stands for a certain grammar or way of speaking of the things you see. It is true that in the Bemerkungen he says that the propositions in the ‘Geometrie des Gesichtsraumes’<sup>111</sup> are ‘reine Grammatik’;<sup>112</sup> and this distinguishes them from the propositions of the ‘Geometrie des physikalischen Raumes’.<sup>113</sup> But in Philosophie he avoids any suggestion that this Grammatik is measured by, or responsible to, the Gesichtsraum as ‘given’ – as though this were something independent of that grammar.

In Philosophie he does speak of einer phänomenologischen Sprache; but this does not have at all the sense or the importance which it has in the Bemerkungen. He is no longer suggesting that ‘Eine Erkenntnis dessen, was unserer Sprache wesentlich und was ihr zur Darstellung unwesentlich ist, kommt auf die Konstruktion einer phänomenologischen Sprache hinaus’.<sup>114</sup>

What he called the ‘Phänomene’<sup>115</sup> were shifting, in more ways

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<sup>104</sup> to construct (or: calculate) the number - it cannot be given just through description

<sup>105</sup> construction

<sup>106</sup> the geometrical conception of proof; cf. Ms 117, 152.

<sup>107</sup> Arithmetic is a more general general kind of geometry; *PB* 1975, 131; *Ts* 209, 46.

<sup>108</sup> *Ts* 213 (“Big Typescript”).

<sup>109</sup> visual space

<sup>110</sup> representation

<sup>111</sup> geometry of visual space; cf. *Ts* 213, 443-461.

<sup>112</sup> nothing but grammar; cf. Ms 108, 168.

<sup>113</sup> geometry of physical space; cf. *Ts* 213, 443-461.

<sup>114</sup> A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, [...] amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language; *Ts* 209, 1.

<sup>115</sup> phenomena

ways than one. It was hard to know whether to treat them as purely particular, or whether to take them as one takes the figures used in a geometrical demonstration. I think Wittgenstein recognized this when he wrote of the objections to speaking of ‘eine nicht-hypothetische Darstellung’<sup>116</sup> (which was what the phänomenologische Sprache was supposed to be). He said that a Darstellung which did not refer in any way beyond what was immediately given here and now, would be without interest – a ‘Satz’ in such a ‘Sprache’ would not be worth saying.

This whole discussion was leading towards the distinction between the meaning of a name and the bearer of a name (which is clearly stated in *Philosophie*). Towards recognizing that the meaning of ‘red’ is never the sense datum to which I ‘point’, etc.. Towards a greater emphasis on: die Grammatik des Zeichens bestimmt die Bedeutung.<sup>117</sup>

The Bemerkungen had already begun the move in this direction, with the theory of ‘die unabhängige Koordinaten der Beschreibung’,<sup>118</sup> the insistence that a proposition has to be understood in ein Satzsystem,<sup>119</sup> and his recognition that there are other systems of internal relations, independent of one another and independent also of the Kalkül der Wahrheitsfunktionen.<sup>120</sup> (It is interesting that it was his search for a ‘rein phänomenologische Farbenlehre’<sup>121</sup> which actually began the movement that led away from the idea of a phänomenologische Sprache.) But in the Bemerkungen he did not come either to the idea of ‘Bedeutungskörper’<sup>122</sup> nor to the recognition of the difference between Träger des Namens and Bedeutung des Namens.<sup>123</sup>

One result of moving in this direction was that Sinn had less to do with ‘unmittelbare Erfahrung’<sup>124</sup> than it generally had in the Bemerkungen. In the Bemerkungen ‘die unmittelbare Erfahrung’ is the source of sense or meaning, in some analogy to the way in which Elementarsätze are the source of it in the Tractatus. But in *Philosophie* the view

view is generally that die Grammatik bestimmt die Bedeutung.<sup>125</sup> And the grammar of a sign is not something which you have before you all

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<sup>116</sup> a description that has nothing hypothetical in it; *PB* 1975, 283; *Ms* 107, 249; *Ts* 209, 130.

<sup>117</sup> the grammar of the sign determines the meaning; cf. *Ts* 213, 198v.

<sup>118</sup> the independent co-ordinates of description; *PB* 1975, 111; *Ms* 108, 52; *Ts* 209, 35.

<sup>119</sup> propositional system; cf. *Ts* 213, 632.

<sup>120</sup> calculus of truthfunctions; cf. *Ts* 213, 715.

<sup>121</sup> purely phenomenological colour theory; *PB* 1975, 273; *Ts* 209, 125.

<sup>122</sup> meaning-body; *Ts* 213, 42r, 166.

<sup>123</sup> bearer of a name and meaning of a name; cf. *Ts* 213, 31r.

<sup>124</sup> immediate experience; *Ts* 213, 489, 528.

<sup>125</sup> grammar determines the meaning; *Ts* 213, 198v.

at once, or something immediately ‘given’.

This might naturally raise the question of how the meaning is ‘given’, or in other words: how we learn it. When we distinguish meaning and bearer of a name, it is clear that we cannot get the meaning just by being given a reproduction or Abbild o//f/ what it applies to. The meaning of the sign is something you learn as you learn the different ‘facets’ of its grammar.

That is: Understanding a word is connected with learning the meaning of a word. It is not something that is shown by ‘logical analysis’. And the learning of a word is ‘spread out in time’.

This is perhaps the biggest difference between Philosophie and the Bemerkungen.

I have spoken of his remark that trying to construct a phenomenological language is an attempt to give ‘eine nicht-hypothetische Darstellung’. If we ask why anyone should want such a thing, there would be various reasons. But one principal reason was connected with his criticisms of the Extensiv-auffassung<sup>126</sup> and the ideas of infinity which went with this; and also with his objection to ‘eine logische Hypothese’.<sup>127</sup> He thought that Russell’s Axiom of Infinity and also the Auswahl-axiom<sup>128</sup> were ‘logische Hypothesen’. And in particular (p.161, paragraph 174) ‘Die Mengenlehre ist darum falsch, weil sie scheinbar einen Symbolismus voraussetzt, den es nicht gibt, statt dessen den es gibt (der allein möglich ist).’ ‘Eine Verbindung zwischen Symbolen, die besteht, sich aber nicht durch symbolische Übergänge darstellen läßt, ist ein Gedanke der sich nicht denken läßt.’<sup>129</sup> And that would be a logische Hypothese. But something similar applies to

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to certain uses of ‘und so weiter’;<sup>130</sup> in Cantor’s infinite series of infinite decimals, for instance. But the objection applies also to Wittgenstein’s own use of ‘und so weiter’ in the Tractatus, when he introduces numbers from the general form of operation, and the construction of a formal series through its repetition. (What he says about induction in the Bemerkungen is relevant to this, I suppose, but I will steer past this.) In the Bemerkungen he sees that ‘und so weiter’ cannot be interpreted as it was in the Tractatus. And he now suggests

<sup>126</sup> extensional viewpoint

<sup>127</sup> hypothesis in logic; *PB* 1975 211; *Ts* 209, 91.

<sup>128</sup> axiom of choice

<sup>129</sup> Set theory is wrong because it apparently presupposes a symbolism which doesn’t exist instead of one that does exist (is alone possible). [...] A connection between symbols which exists but cannot be represented by symbolic transformations is a thought that cannot be thought, *PB* 1975, 211-212; *Ts* 209, 91-92.

<sup>130</sup> and so on

that nothing in arithmetic is derived from any reflexions on logic. 'Jede /Rechnung/ der Mathematik ist eine Anwendung ihrer Selbst und hat nur als solche Sinn. Darum ist es nicht nötig, bei der Begründung der Arithmetik von der allgemeinen Form der logischen Operationen zu reden.'<sup>131</sup> (page 80) From this he goes on almost at once to say, 'Man könnte sagen, die Arithmetik ist eine Art Geometrie.'<sup>132</sup> I am suggesting that his frequent remarks such as 'nur das, was wir sehen können, ist ein Gesetz'<sup>133</sup> went together [(1) with his criticisms of the Extensional-auffassung and of 'logische Hypothesen'; and also together with (2) his interest in eine phänomenologische Sprache – eine nicht hypothetische Darstellung<sup>134</sup> – as that in which Sinn<sup>135</sup> and the distinction between denkbar and 'nicht denkbar' was unmittelbar gegeben.<sup>136</sup>

I have been trying to suggest that certain prominent features of the Bemerkungen hang together. And I suggest also that when they are not in this sort of internal relation with one another, then we no longer have the same view being put forward.

Certain philosophical differences can be brought out best by treating the same material in different ways – as in these /two/ books.

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My proposals are:

- 1) Both books should be published.
- 2) The Bemerkungen should be published soon – if only to check the growth of misunderstandings regarding Wittgenstein's work and the relations between earlier and later stages of it.
- 3) For this reason the Bemerkungen should be published in German, without waiting for a translation.

a) I do not at all object to publishing a translation with it. But I suppose it would delay publication by 12 months or more, if we waited until a translation were ready.

b) I do not think that a publication of the German separately first would make it difficult to publish a translation with it (or separately)

<sup>131</sup> Every mathematical calculation is an application of itself and only as such does it have a sense. That is why it isn't necessary to speak about the general form of logical operation when giving a foundation to arithmetic.; *PB* 1975, 130; *Ts* 209, 46.

<sup>132</sup> You could say arithmetic is a kind of geometry.; *PB* 1975, 131; *Ts* 209, 46; *Ts* 213, 550.

<sup>133</sup> only what we can see is a law; cf. *PB* 1975, 234; *Ts* 213, 762; *Ts* 209, 105.

<sup>134</sup> interest in phenomenological language – a description that has nothing hypothetical in it  
<sup>135</sup> meaning

<sup>136</sup> conceivable and inconceivable what is given immediately; *PB* 1975, 266; *Ts* 209, 121.

later.

c) I know that I am myself to blame for the long delay in publication; and it may sound absurd for me to speak of urgency. I would rather it were voiced by someone else. But I think the urgency is real.

4) I do not know whether Blackwells would publish the German text alone. They might. If they would not, I am pretty sure Surkamp would.

5) Supposing that Blackwells were ready to be responsible for publication if someone else paid the cost, I should like to raise and provide the money for this myself.

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I have not asked the executors of Waismann's papers<sup>137</sup> for permission to print anything from his notes. McGuinness seemed to think permission would be given. But I wanted to know first whether you were in agreement.

I mean to enclose with this letter the full text of Wittgenstein's draft for a Preface.<sup>138</sup> I found the first page and a half so interesting when I read it, that I wanted to print that. But his own reflexions when he speaks of 'die Gefahr eines langen Vorworts',<sup>139</sup> and of the only 'anständige'<sup>140</sup> course to take, made me sure that this would be wrong. If there is any sort of editorial introduction, then there would not be the same objection to quoting both the earlier version and also his subsequent criticism. There might be other objections, of course.

I will stop.

*Rush Rhees*

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<sup>137</sup> See footnote 17.

<sup>138</sup> Ms 109, 204-208.

<sup>139</sup> the danger in a long foreword; Ms 109, 208; November 1930, *VB* 1977, 10.

<sup>140</sup> decent

Burrowdown,  
Southward Lane,  
Langland, Swansea,  
Great Britain.  
April 22nd, 1964.

Dear von Wright,

Thank you for your letter of April 8th.

I think it would be better to meet in Oxford. *Ceteris paribus* it would suit me a little better if we could discuss the things on which I am working during the first week – say the /21st/ to the 26th of September. But it is not really of much consequence, and I shall be well content to have it the week following if either Elizabeth or you prefers it so. I hope that B.F.McGuinness may be in Oxford at that time. He has been especially helpful in connexion with the Waismann material, and he may have got wind of another Wittgenstein typescript would – if it exists – be important for my purposes.

With regard to most of the questions concerning the Philosophische Bemerkungen it may be a case of *alea jacta est* by that time; but probably this is optimistic. Schollick<sup>141</sup> has arranged to bring it out jointly with Suhrkamp (in Frankfurt). I hope that it will be printed in Germany – there are likely to be fewer mistakes this way – and in this case Suhrkamp will send to Schollick the sheets for the number of volumes that he wants. Dr. Unseld<sup>142</sup> (who seems to be the principal director of Suhrkamp) wants to bring it out in October, but as I say, this may be optimism.

Ryle has given permission to include as appendices the two passages from Waismann's notes to Wittgenstein's discussions which I included in the typescript I sent you. (Ryle seems to be the principal of Waismann's literary executors. The other two are Berlin and Hampshire.<sup>143</sup>) I sent copies of those to Ryle when I asked his permission, and I also included a passage in which Wittgenstein makes some remarks about Schlick's book on ethics,<sup>144</sup> and on his own lecture on ethics,<sup>145</sup> which Schlick and Waismann had

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<sup>141</sup> Henry Schollick was director of Blackwell from 1950 to 1960 and published the first volumes edited by Wittgenstein's literary executors.

<sup>142</sup> Siegfried Unseld (1924-2002) was director of Suhrkamp that published the volumes from Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* in German.

<sup>143</sup> See footnote 17.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Schlick 1930.

evidently read. This was in December, 1930. I told Ryle that I was not certain whether I would include this or not, but I asked his permission all the same. I have still not decided. And since I cannot seem to bring myself out of this state, I expect that the bus will have gone while I am still undecided. That lecture of Wittgenstein's belongs to the same time as the *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. (You will remember that he gave it to 'The Heretics' in Cambridge – some time during the session 1929-30, I think; although it might have been in the autumn of 1930.) It is in English, and the German edition might require a translation of

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it as well; but this would not present any great difficulty. It could be printed at the end of the volume, together with the remarks from Waismann's notes. On the other hand, the connexion between it and the discussions in the *Bemerkungen* would not be very plain; less plain than is the connexion between the remarks on ethics and the rest of the *Tractatus*, for instance. And it might go better in another context.

I had been thinking of a smallish volume which might include this together with the remarks on Frazer,<sup>146</sup> for instance (which were written about a year later), and some related remarks of about this same time (there are at least two longish ones besides the remarks on Frazer). And it might include some of the later scattered remarks upon religion and upon 'value' (*Lebensweisheit*,<sup>147</sup> or call it how you will). When I say 'later remarks', I am at the moment thinking of 1937, or 1938; and possibly as late as 1946. Those are details that would have to be settled. My main concern is whether the lecture on ethics would go better in that context, or as an addendum to the *Bemerkungen*. And I think it might go better in the separate volume. I am still not sure. I know there are certain objections to publishing a volume devoted entirely to questions of this kind. On the other hand, I do not see just where the notes on Frazer, for instance, could be published unless it were in a volume of this sort. And certain changes or developments in his ways of discussing these questions could be brought out best if the volume were to start with the lecture on ethics, I think.

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<sup>145</sup> Ms 139, Wittgenstein gave this lecture at a meeting of the Heretics Club in Cambridge on 17 November 1929.

<sup>146</sup> The "later scattered remarks upon religion and upon 'value'" entered von Wright's edition *VB*. 1977.

<sup>147</sup> worldly wisdom

There are many more subsidiary questions that come into this matter. But if you do have any views on the either – or that keeps me wobbling, I should be grateful for them.

There will be quite a lot to discuss about Philosophie. But I hope to send you some material between now and then. The scene has changed in important ways since I last wrote you about it. But I still feel strongly that a volume should be (I want to say ‘must be’) published.

If I close this now, I might just catch the postal collection.

*Rush Rhees*

Burrowdown, Southward Lane,  
Langland, Swansea.

November 1st, 1964.

Dear von Wright,

Thank you for your letters of the 26th and 27th of October. The page was missing from my copy of the Notebooks, and I was very glad to have it.<sup>148</sup> On the other hand, I have not the page which you want.<sup>149</sup> If the Notebooks were typed directly from the manuscript, rather than from photographs, then it may be that this page was not photographed. It would be strange if it had been lost from all three sets.

I am sending you a copy of the early letter to Ramsey, and also of the later notes on Frazer, which I have typed from the pencilled pages which Elizabeth sent me.<sup>150</sup> At least, I believe they are later than the 1931 lot. And Elizabeth seemed to think they belong to notes which he made while he was living in her house.<sup>151</sup>

I have not forgotten the copy of the longer typescript, and I hope I shall send the first installment of this in the next day or two.

The ‘Philosophische Bemerkungen’ is coming out without an index, and I am annoyed about this. Suhrkamp (the German pub-

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<sup>148</sup> This refers to one page from Ms 101-103, but is not specified in von Wright’s letter.

<sup>149</sup> Ms 103, 9r.

<sup>150</sup> This probably refers to Ms 143, which today is considered to stem earliest from 1936 and maybe after 1948; cf. *GB* 1979, 1993, Westergaard 2015. Cf. also Westergaard 2016.

<sup>151</sup> Spring 1950-February 1951.

lishers) had apparently decided to get the book out within a few days of the announced date – no matter what the delays had been in the earlier stages. At the end much of the correspondence was being done by telegram. And by the time I had received the last page proofs and wanted to discuss the index, the book seems to have been on the way to the binders. Elizabeth would say that by taking a stronger line I could still have made them hold the thing up until an index was ready. No doubt she is right. But my incompetence was in part due to the fact that I did not realize what Suhrkamp's plans were: I did not realize that they had started on the operations which they were in fact completing. The book needs an index, and I am annoyed. It would take me at least three weeks to make an index (perhaps more); and by the time I finished writing to Suhrkamp about the matter, the book would be bound and in the book-shops. But I admit I have been weak and muddle-headed (and those two run into one another).

I do not know what other mistakes there may be in the book. Probably many.

Yours sincerely,

*Rush Rhees*

Burrowdown, Southward Lane.  
Langland, Swansea.  
December 8th, 1964.

Dear Mc Guinness,

I have never thanked you for your letter of November 11th, together with your corrections and comments on the copies of the proofs of the two shorter Waismann appendices<sup>152</sup> which I had sent you. I was not able to make use of your corrections, because at that time the German publisher was moving so fast that I was unable to keep track of the state of the printing. When I telephoned him on about the 27th of October, to ask if I could strike out a sentence in one of my footnotes, he told me that it was too late. He had first said that he would publish in October. There had been a delay – a mix up at that end, this time – during the summer, and he seems to have resolved to make up for lost time. The book seems to have appeared at the end of November, and I have just received a few copies. I am sending one of them to you at the same time as I post this letter. (In my note at the end I have mentioned – inadequately – your kindness in making the Waismann material available to us.)

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<sup>152</sup> Rhees added to his edition *PB* 1964 notes from Waismann taken between December 1929 and September 1931. *PB* 1975, 315-346.

I wish in particular that I might have made some of the obvious corrections in the “Maßstab und Satzsystem”<sup>153</sup> appendix. And I have no doubt that there are many, and perhaps more serious mistakes in the “Widerspruchsfreiheit”<sup>154</sup> appendix. If there should ever be a second printing, they can be corrected there. Meanwhile, I hope very much that you will publish the whole of the Waismann notes. They will be an immeasurable help to those who have not seen even the faulty versions which you first sent me. But I speak chiefly from selfish motives: it would help any who write about Wittgenstein or are working on him to be able to refer to those notes as they are published. You seem to have done a lot of work on them already; perhaps the more fussy parts of the job are/n<sup>o</sup>w/sub<sup>d</sup>ued and less disheartening: I can only hope so.

I knew I was taking liberties with the appendix on den “Beweis für alle reellen Zahlen”.<sup>155</sup> The text as it stood in the typescript you sent – the interspersal of “Seiten” and “Rückseiten”<sup>156</sup> – could not be made coherent as a whole. I thought that some of the versions were probably Waismann’s re-formulations, although I had no sure guide. Since I was not presenting it as Wittgenstein’s own text, I persuaded myself that this might not be of crucial importance in this context. The passages showed something important about the way Wittgenstein was thinking about real numbers at this time.

(I wish especially that I had realized that the date was September, not December. I was guessing from the nearest date which I could see in the typescript.) The next volume which I hope to publish (if I can

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can ever move faster than a dying donkey) will have further discussion of real numbers, and perhaps I can make some reference to the corrections needed in this note. Anyway, I hope that your edition of the notes will have been published by then.

There are still misprints in the book. And I had hoped to make an index – here again I was foiled by the speed at the end. (Incidentally, I told Blackwell explicitly that I did not want my name to appear on the title page. In the final page proofs it was not there, and I thought all was well.) Still, I admit that I am relieved to have it out. People will discover faults enough, but they can see roughly what it is – if they want to read it.

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<sup>153</sup> yardstick and system of proposition; *PB* 1975, 317.

<sup>154</sup> consistency; *PB* 1975, 318-346.

<sup>155</sup> a proof for all real numbers; *PB* 1975, 245.

<sup>156</sup> pages and reverse pages

Yours sincerely,  
[no signature on the carbon copy]

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### **Biographical Note**

Christian Erbacher (b. 1979) received his diploma in psychology from the University of Regensburg (Germany) in 2006 and his PhD in philosophy from the University of Bergen (Norway) in 2010. Between 2010 and 2015 he has conducted the research project "Shaping the Domain of Knowledge by Editorial Processing: the Case of Wittgenstein's Work". He is continuing his work on the history of editing Wittgenstein's writings as part of the Collaborative Research Center "Media of Cooperation" at the University of Siegen (Germany).

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